Ian Barbour's Methodology in Science and Religion

Robert John Russell

During the past half century of its inception and flourishing, the question of method lies at the heart of the theology and science community: how are we to relate these two disparate fields? I will take the question as broadly including issues in epistemology, the nature of scientific and religious language, as well as issues in theory construction, choice and defense. 

We will find that the contributions by Ian G. Barbour to method dating back to the 1960s form the initial bridge, to use my favorite metaphor for it, across which so much traffic now flows and in both directions according to my extension of his work which I call ‘creative mutual interaction’ (CMI) and that his contributions to method have continued up through the present discussion to be of pioneering and critical value.  Barbour called his method critical realism, a phrase taken up by almost all of the scholars who have adopted, adapted, extended, and critiqued Barbour’s methodological bridge. 

1. Critical realism: Barbour’s original ‘bridge’ between science and religion.

In his ground-breaking 1966 publication, Issues in Science and Religion, Ian G. Barbour laid out a series of well-crafted arguments involving issues in epistemology (the kinds of knowledge we have), language (how it is expressed), and methodology (how it is obtained and justified).[1] Together these arguments provide what I call the ‘bridge’[2] between science and religion. More than any other scholar’s work, these arguments, in my opinion, have made possible the developments of the past five decades. Barbour has explored these arguments in detail since then, principally through his 1990 Gifford Lectures, together with their revisions in 1997[3] and 2000.[4]

From the outset, Barbour used the term critical realism[5] to stand for the specific set of arguments he first developed in 1966. Most scholars in the field have adopted and developed the term, although some, while sharing one or more of its arguments, have moved away from the term (as we shall see below). Barbour viewed critical realism as an alternative to three competing interpretations of scientific theories: (1) classical or naive realism: scientific theories provide a ‘photographic’ or literal representation of the world; (2) instrumentalism: scientific theories are mere calculative devices, and (3) idealism: scientific theories depict reality as mental. Instead, from a critical realist perspective, scientific theories yield partial, revisable, abstract, but referential knowledge of the world. Linguistically, scientific theories are expressed through metaphors and models which ... selectively represent particular aspects of the world for specific purposes... (They) are to be taken seriously but not literally.[6] Scientific models are thus systematically developed metaphors. Turning to religion, he defined ‘metaphor’ similarly as an open-ended analogy. Although more than a useful fiction, the meaning of a religious metaphor cannot be reduced a set of literal statements.[7]

Barbour then turned to the then current discussion of scientific methodology, with major breakthroughs by such philosophers of science as N. R. Hanson, Gerald Holton, Thomas Kuhn, Michael Polanyi, Steven Toulmin, and Imre Lakatos.[8] He began with the empiricism of Carl Hempel, whose ‘hypothetico-deductive’ method brought together inductivist and deductivist approaches to the construction and testing of theories vis. Popperian falsificationism. In the 1960s, this method was fundamentally recast. It was then seen to operate within both the historicist and contextualist elements which characterize the scientific community. These elements include the ‘theory-laddenness of data’, the role of intersubjectivity rather than strict objectivity in scientific rationality, the way science is structured through paradigms and the revolutions in such paradigms in the history of science, the presence of metaphysical assumptions about nature in scientific paradigms, and the role of aesthetics and values in theory choice. Scientific theories, while referring to the world and conveying truths about it, are a human construction and their conclusions are inherently tentative and subject to revision. Nevertheless, according to Barbour, they are to be assessed by four criteria which are reasonably trans-paradigmatic and undergird their objectivity: agreement with data, coherence, scope and fertility.

Barbour used these criteria to articulate what he called a critical realist theory of truth.[9] Like classical realism, the meaning of truth in critical realism is correspondence with reality (i.e., reference) and the key criterion of truth is agreement of theory with data. But we often have only indirect evidence for our theories; moreover, networks of theories are tested together. Thus internal coherence and scope also serve as criteria of truth, as stressed by rationalists and philosophical idealists. Even this is insufficient when competing theories are equally coherent and comprehensive; hence fruitfulness serves as a fourth criterion of truth, as pragmatists, instrumentalists and linguistic analysts stress. Thus intelligibility and explanatory power, and not just observableness or predictive success, is a guide to the real.[10]

Turning to philosophy of religion, Barbour constructed a similar defense of critical realism. Here his sources in religious epistemology, methodology and language include the writings of John Wisdom, John Hick, Ian Ramsey and Frederick Ferré.[11] With these arguments in place, Barbour was prepared to make his crucial, methodological claim that, in my term, ‘bridges’ science and religion: the basic structure of religion is similar to that of science in some respects, though it differs at several crucial points.[12]

Similarities: Both science and religion make cognitive claims about the world using a hypothetico-deductive method and a contextualist and historicist framework. Both communities organize observation and experience through models seen as analogical, extensible, coherent and symbolic, and these models are expressed through metaphors.[13] Differences: But there are important differences in the ‘data’ of religion compared to that of science.[14] Religious models serve non-cognitive functions which are missing in science, such as eliciting attitudes, personal involvement and transformation. Moreover, compared to science, where theories tend to dominate models, in religion models are more influential than theories.[15] Religion lacks lower-level laws such as those found in science, and the emergence of consensus seems an unrealizable goal. Religion also includes elements not found in science such as story, ritual, and revelation through historical events.[16]

Barbour’s argument culminates in his use of paradigm analysis to place science and religion on a continuous spectrum in which both display „subjective’ as well as ‘objective’ features, though the former are more prominent in religion and the latter in science.[17] The subjective features include the influence of theory on data, the resistance of comprehensive theories to falsification, and the absence of rules for choice among paradigms.[18]Objective features include. It is the dynamic tension between similarities and differences, and between subjective and objective features in both science and religion, that together make Barbour’s analysis so original and fruitful.

2. Further developments of critical realism in theology and science

Barbour’s arguments have been developed in significant and diverse ways by a variety of scholars. In his 1979 Bampton Lectures[19] and in his 1983 Mendenhall Lectures,[20] Arthur Peacocke endorsed critical realism in both science and religion. In his 1993 Gifford Lectures[21] Peacocke acknowledged the diversity of positions held by scientific realists but argued for a „common core“ of claims: that scientific change is progressive and that the aim of science is to depict reality. Peacocke made a similar case for critical realism in theology: As in science, theological concepts and models are partial, inadequate, and revisable, and, unlike those in science, they include a strong, affective function. Still Peacocke views them as (the) necessary and, indeed, the only ways of referring to ‘God’ and to God’s relation with humanity, though he stresses that referring to God (e.g., the via positiva) does not mean describing God (the via negativa). Its grounding in a continuous community and interpretive tradition make it „reasonable“ to accept theology’s explication of religious experience, though metaphorical and revisable, as an inference to the best explanation.[22]

According to John Polkinghorne, critical realism is the best explanation of the success of science, the only philosophy adequate to scientific experience, and the view most congenial to scientists themselves. In his 1994 Gifford Lectures, Polkinghorne drew on Thomas Torrance and Polanyi in highlight the doubly circular character of knowledge: belief and understanding are mutually entailing, and what is known and the knowledge of it are mutually conforming.[23] Scientific theories are shaped by the way things are, offering an ever increasing degree of verisimilitude as suggested by his motto, „epistemology models ontology.“[24] Polkinghorne offers similar arguments for theology, too.

3. The importance of Lakatos in theology and science

Barbour was the first scholar in the field to discuss the potential importance to theology of the writings of Imre Lakatos in the philosophy of science. Since then Lakatos’ ideas have been extensively discussed by Nancey Murphy and Philip Clayton.

Murphy’s arguments arose in 1990 through her criticism of Wolfhart Pannenberg’s methodology.[25] Pannenberg uses Stephen Toulmin’s claim that theories in history, science, and hermeneutics serve as explanations by placing facts in a broader context. For theology, the explanatory context becomes the whole of reality, including the future. In place of Toulmin, Murphy urges us to adopt the work of Lakatos, with its view of scientific theories as structured by a central core and a surrounding belt of auxiliary hypotheses. Following Lakatos, we should judge the relative progress or degeneration of such research programs on the basis of their ability to predict and corroborate novel facts. [26] Murphy then offers a crucial modification of Lakatos’ conception of ‘novel facts’: „A fact is novel if it is one not used in the construction of the theory T that it is taken to confirm... (that is) one whose existence, relevance to T, or interpretability in light of T is first documented after T is proposed.“[27] This modification allows Murphy to apply Lakatos’ methodology to theology, to decide rationally which theological research programs are empirically progressive, and thus to complete the argument for the scientific status of theology.

Philip Clayton has also advocated the theological appropriation of Lakatosian methodology.[28] Clayton views „explanation“ as the key concept embracing both the natural and social sciences and, ultimately, theology. In the natural sciences, where one interprets physical data, the truth of an explanation is pivotal. In the social sciences, however, where one interprets both physical data and the experience of actor-subjects (i.e., the „double hermeneutic“), explanation means „understanding.“ Theological explanations, then, are subject to validation not by verificationist standards, but by intersubjective testability and universalizability, as performed by the disciplinary community. The key, though, is Lakatos’ requirement that a previously specified set of criteria is held by the community by which competing explanatory hypotheses can be assessed, including the stipulation of „novel facts“.

Murphy’s approach has been implemented in discussions of theological anthropology by Philip Hefner,[29] pragmatic evaluation of religion by Karl Peters,[30] and the theological implications of cosmology in my work[31]. I believe that further pursuit of the suggestions by both Murphy and Clayton is an extremely important task at the frontiers of theology and science today.[32]

4. Key critiques by social constructivists and feminists

Even while Barbour was developing this position, scientific realism was being challenged in a number of ways.[33] Feminists critiques of science have stressed the crucial role of gender analysis in uncovering distortions in scientific research. According to Evelyn Fox Keller and Helen E. Longino,[34] the roots of the feminist critique lie in externalist arguments of Kuhn but the focus is on the novel concept of ‘gender’ as the social constitution of ‘masculine’ and ‘feminine’ applied independently of the biological categories of male and female. Early feminists sought a ‘gender-free’ science by urging greater access for women in science education and research. More recent writings have used the concept of gender to analyze the content and practice of science, to detect the distortions introduced by gender bias, to uncover the sexual metaphors used for nature that legitimate dominance over nature.[35]

Barbour’s assessment of these diverse externalist accounts is that they provide a „valuable corrective“ to the internalist view, particularly regarding the context of discovery. However, the appeal to interests is hard to document, the shift towards relativism „...underestimates the constraints on theories by the data“ and testing of theories reduces distortions due to ideologies and interests. He agrees with feminists in their challenge of dualist thought and the pervasive role of values and interests in scientific inquiry, but he calls for a rejection of dualism and not their inversion.

I would add a concern for what can be called a „feminist critique of science and religion.“ Margaret Wertheim,[36] for example, has argued for a parallel between the marginalization of women in religion and in physics. Historically women were excluded from European universities, and thus from participating in the rise of science. Today, „the struggle women have faced to gain entry into science parallels the struggle they have faced to gain entry into the clergy.“ Wertheim advocates instead „a culture of physics that would encourage both men and women to pursue different kinds of goals and ideals...more concerned with human beings and our needs.“[37] I believe that a sustained focus on issues of gender as a clue to how scientific and theological voices have influenced --- and distorted --- each other and the inclusion of womanist, mujerista, and other womens’ voices will mark an important new development in „science and religion’.

5. An interaction model of theology and science

A major challenge continues to be whether science and theology be genuinely interactive, each offering something of intellectual value to the other, or is the theological role one merely of hermeneutics? In recent writings[38], I have explored the possibility that theology can, at least in some cases, lead to creative suggestions for scientific research which science would find beneficial as judged by it own, independent criteria in what I call the method of ‘creative mutual interaction” (CMI).

My proposal combines the depiction of the sciences and humanities (including theology) as ordered in an epistemic hierarchy, as proposed by Peacocke and by Murphy, with Barbour’s proposal of an analogy between theological and scientific methodologies. The result is striking: we can identify a number of distinct ‘paths’ between theology and science.[39] Five paths move upwards as influences by science on theology, while three paths move downwards conveying suggestive ideas for research programs in science from theology. I believe that each path represents what has actually happened historically and what happens, though often unacknowledged, in current research. By reflecting on all eight paths together we can discern something about the interaction of theology and science as a whole, something which we have not appreciated by taking each path separately. The overall perspective might also tell us something about the direction for ‘theology and science’ in the future.

6. Summary of the status of critical realism and open issues

Over the past five decades, the predominant school of thought among scholars in theology and science, particularly of those coming from a liberal Anglo-American theological perspective, has been critical realism. The term stood for a ‘packaged deal’ whose elements were brought together from a variety of various philosophical contexts, as discussed above. Each of these elements, of course, raised complex issues that were highly debated. Still there was sufficient agreement for these elements to form what can be called the ‘consensus view’ in theology and science since the 1960’s. For these scholars, critical realism was seen as providing the crucial ‘bridge’ between theology and science, making possible real dialogue and growing interaction.

During this period, however, each of these elements has come under criticism. Some scholars have stressed the difficulties facing a realist interpretation of fundamental scientific theories, such as quantum mechanics,[40] as well as key theological terms, such as the concept of God[41]. Some have acknowledged the diversity of realist positions taken by philosophers[42] as well as the continuing challenge to realism by the sociology of knowledge.[43] Some have given increased attention to the diversity of models of rationality and their relative appropriateness for „science and religion’[44] and the importance of pragmatic differences, as well as similarities, between theology and science.[45] Some have argued that critical realism is an unworkable „middle ground’ between naïve realism and relativistic interpretations such as the strong program in science.[46] Others have argued for a ‘constructive-critical realism’ which emphasized the role of the subject especially in relation to the humanities.[47] Some have moved to a non-foundationalist epistemology, either keeping correspondence and referentiality[48] or shifting to a pragmatic theory of truth.[49] Some working with an all-embracing philosophical system, such as Whiteheadian metaphysics, have developed a broad set of theological positions in light of science,[50] while others who make more limited use of metaphysics have developed equally broad theological arguments.[51] Other positions have emerged at increasing distances from the ‘consensus view’. For some, a post-modernist view offers an attractive approach, and for growing numbers, feminist critiques of science are crucial. Some have abandoned realism as a whole while still finding elements of the preceding still helpful in relating science and religion.[52]

On balance, though, critical realism, as originally constructed by Barbour five decades ago, has continued to be defended, deployed and diversified widely in theology and science, and it continues to be presupposed by both most working scientists, by many theologians, and in much of the public discourse about both science and religion. On balance I believe it to be of enduring importance, both for its crucial role in the historical developments of the past decades and as a point of departure for future research. Surely Barbour’s proposal constitutes the key methodological contribution that the ‘first generation’ gave to make discourse regarding theology and science possible today.

Robert John Russell
Published on this site June 2014


  We offer the article also in a German translation.

This material is drawn from Robert John Russell, “Ian Barbour’s Methodological Breakthrough: Creating the Bridge for Science and Theology,” Fifty Years in Science and Religion: Ian G. Barbour and his Legacy (Ashgate: 2004). Previous portions of this material can be found online as ‘Theology and Science: Current Issues and Future Directions’.

Robert J. Russell is Founder and Director of the Center for Theology and the Natural Sciences (CTNS) and the Ian G. Barbour Professor of Theology and Science in Residence at the Graduate Theological Union, Berkeley, CA. He is a leading researcher and spokesperson for the growing international body of theologians and scientists committed to a positive dialogue and creative mutual interaction between these fields. He is the author of the upcoming book, Time in Eternity: Pannenberg, Physics and Eschatology in Creative Mutual Interaction (University of Notre Dame Press, 2012). His most recent books include Cosmology from Alpha to Omega: The Creative Mutual Interaction of Theology and Science (Fortress Press, 2009) and Cosmology, Evolution, and Resurrection Hope: Theology and Science in Creative Mutual Interaction (Pandora Press, 2006). He has co-edited a six volume CTNS/Vatican Observatory series on scientific perspectives on divine action and the first in the new series on scientific perspectives on the problem of natural evil. He co-edited Resurrection: Theological and Scientific Assessments ( Eerdmans, 2002) and edited the festschrift, Fifty Years in Science and Religion: Ian G. Barbour and His Legacy (Ashgate, 2004). He is a founding co-editor of the scholarly journal Theology and Science which CTNS members internationally receive. Dr. Russell is an ordained minister in the United Church of Christ. He received a Ph.D. in physics from the University of California at Santa Cruz (1978) and an M.A. in Theology and an M. Div. from Pacific School of Religion (1972). He taught physics and courses in science and religion at Carleton College, Northfield, Minnesota, for several years before coming to the GTU in 1981. His spouse, Charlotte, is an associate minister at First Congregational Church, Berkeley.


[1] Ian G. Barbour, Issues in Science and Religion (New York: Harper & Row, 1971 (originally published in 1966 by Prentice Hall)), 470 pp. See especially Part Two: „Religion and the Methods of Science.“

[2] I discuss this metaphor in Robert John Russell, ‘Bridging Theology and Science: The CTNS Logo,’ Theology and Science 1, no. 1 (April 2003): 1 3. For a critique, see W. Mark Richardson and Wesley J. Wildman, eds., Religion and Science: History, Method, Dialogue (New York: Routledge, 1996), xi xiii.

[3] Ian G. Barbour, Religion and Science: Historical and Contemporary Issues (San Francisco: HarperSanFrancisco, 1997).

[4] Ian G. Barbour, When Science Meets Religion (San Francisco: HarperSanFrancisco, 2000).

[5] Barbour, Issues in Science and Religion, Ch. 6/III & IV; Ian G. Barbour, Myths, Models, and Paradigms: A Comparative Study in Science & Religion (New York: Harper & Row, 1974), 3/2; Ian G. Barbour, Religion in an Age of Science, Gifford Lectures; 1989 1990. (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1990), 297 pp, 43. Note that many of the writers in theology and science described here draw on philosophers of science who defend what is more commonly called „scientific realism“ though typically using Barbour’s term, „critical realism.“ See Jarrett Leplin, ed., Scientific Realism (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984) for an overview of realist positions.

[6] Barbour, Religion in an Age of Science, Ch. 2/II, esp. p. 43; Barbour, Issues in Science and Religion, Ch. 6/II/3; Barbour, Myths, Models, and Paradigms, 3/2-3.

[7] Barbour, Myths, Models, and Paradigms, Ch. 2.

[8] Barbour, Religion in an Age of Science, Ch. 2, esp. I/1, II/1, III/1; Barbour, Issues in Science and Religion, Ch. 6/I/1,2, II/1; Barbour, Myths, Models, and Paradigms, Ch. 6.

[9] Barbour, Religion in an Age of Science, 34‑35.

[10] Barbour, Issues in Science and Religion, 170, 173.

[11] Barbour, Religion in an Age of Science, Chs. 2, 3; Barbour, Issues in Science and Religion, Chs. 8, 9; Barbour, Myths, Models, and Paradigms, Chs. 4, 5, 7, 8, 9.

[12] Barbour, Religion in an Age of Science, 36.

[13] Barbour, Religion in an Age of Science, Ch. 2/II; Barbour, Issues in Science and Religion, Ch. 8/I/4; Barbour, Myths, Models, and Paradigms, Chs. 4, 5.

[14] Barbour, Religion in an Age of Science, Ch 2, esp. I/1 3 and Figs. 1 and 2.

[15] Barbour, Religion in an Age of Science, 46 47, 65; Barbour, Issues in Science and Religion, Ch. 8/II, 9/I/3; Barbour, Myths, Models, and Paradigms, Ch. 4/5.

[16] Barbour, Religion in an Age of Science, ch. 2/I/3; Barbour, Issues in Science and Religion, ch. 8/III; Barbour, Myths, Models, and Paradigms, ch. 7/4.

[17] Barbour, Myths, Models, and Paradigms, Kap. 7, especially 118, 144‑45; Barbour, Religion in an Age of Science, ch. 2 section III, IV, especially 65.

[18] For a response to Anthony Flew and others on falsifiability in religion, see Barbour, Myths, Models, and Paradigms, Ch. 7/2.

[19] Arthur R. Peacocke, Creation and the World of Science: The Bampton Lectures, 1979 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979).

[20] Arthur R. Peacocke, Intimations of Reality: Critical Realism in Science and Religion: The Mendenhall Lectures, 1983 (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1984), 94 pp.

[21] Arthur Peacocke, Theology for a Scientific Age: Being and Becoming - Natural, Divine and Human, Enlarged Edition (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1993).

[22] Peacocke, Theology for Scientific Age, 11-19.

[23] John C. Polkinghorne, The Faith of a Physicist: Reflections of a Bottom up Thinker (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1994), 32.

[24] John Polkinghorne, One World: The Interaction of Science and Theology (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), 22 24; Polkinghorne, The Faith of a Physicist, 25, 156.and see the following quotation.

[25] Wolfhart Pannenberg, Theology and the Philosophy of Science, translated by Francis McDonagh (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1976), 458 pp.

[26] See Murphy, Theology in the Age of Scientific Reasoning, Ch. 3, esp. p. 58-61.

[27] Murphy, Theology in the Age of Scientific Reasoning, 68. Note that without careful attention to Murphy’s modification, the notion of "prediction" might seem to undercut the applicability of Lakatos to theology. See for example Polkinghorne, The Faith of a Physicist, 49 and Niels Henrik Gregersen, ‘A Contextual Coherence Theory for the Theology Science Dialogue,’ in Rethinking Theology and Science: Six Models for the Current Dialogue, ed. Niels Henrik Gregersen and J. Wentzel van Huyssteen (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1998), 205 12, esp. 208-09. For a substantive critique of the claim that discernment can yield novel facts see Drees, Religion, Science and Naturalism, 143-44.

[28] Philip Clayton, Explanation from Physics to Theology: An Essay in Rationality and Religion (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1989), 230 pp.

[29] Philip Hefner, The Human Factor: Evolution, Culture, and Religion, Theology and the Sciences Series (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1993), 317 pp.

[30] Karl E. Peters, ‘Storytellers and Scenario Spinners: Some Reflections on Religion and Science in Light of a Pragmatic, Evolutionary Theory of Knowledge,’ Zygon: Journal of Religion and Science 32.4 (December 1997).

[31] Robert John Russell, ‘Finite Creation Without a Beginning: The Doctrine of Creation in Relation to Big Bang and Quantum Cosmologies,’ in Quantum Cosmology and the Laws of Nature: Scientific Perspectives on Divine Action, ed. Robert J. Russell, Nancey C. Murphy and Chris J. Isham, Scientific Perspectives on Divine Action Series (Vatican City State; Berkeley, Calif.: Vatican Observatory Publications; Center for Theology and the Natural Sciences, 1993), 468 pp; Nancey Murphy and George F. Ellis, On the Moral Nature of the Universe: Theology, Cosmology, and Ethics, Theology and the Sciences Series (Minneapolis, Minn.: Fortress Press, 1996), 268 pp.

[32] For additional discussion see Philip Clayton and Steven Knapp, ‘Rationality and Christian Self Conception,’ in Religion and Science: History, Method, Dialogue, ed. W. Mark Richardson and Wesley J. Wildman (New York: Routledge, 1996), 450 pp, 131-44; Nicholas Wolterstorff, ‘Entitled Christian Belief,’ in Religion and Science: History, Method, Dialogue, ed. W. Mark Richardson and Wesley J. Wildman (New York: Routledge, 1996), 450 pp, 145-50; Nancey Murphy, ‘On the Nature of Theology,’ in Religion and Science: History, Method, Dialogue, ed. W. Mark Richardson and Wesley J. Wildman (New York: Routledge, 1996), 450 pp, 151-60; Philip Clayton and Steven Knapp, ‘Is Holistic Justification Enough?’ in Religion and Science: History, Method, Dialogue, ed. W. Mark Richardson and Wesley J. Wildman (New York: Routledge, 1996), 450 pp, 161-69; Gregory Peterson, ‘The Scientific Status of Theology: Imre Lakatos, Method and Demarcation,’ Perspectives on Science and Christian Faith 50.1 (March 1998).

[33] Barbour, Religion in an Age of Science, 74‑76.

[34] Evelyn Fox Keller and Helen E. Longino, Editors, Feminism & Science (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996). Prior major works on feminism and science include Sandra Harding, The Science Question in Feminism (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1986), Evelyn Fox Keller, Reflections on Gender and Science (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985), and Helen Longino, Science as Social Knowledge: Values and Objectivity in Scientific Inquiry (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990).

[35] Sandra Harding, ‘Why Has the Sex/Gender System Become Visible Only Now?’ in Discovering Reality: Feminist Perspectives on Epistemology, Metaphysics, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science, ed. Sandra Harding and Merrill B. Hintikka (Dordrecht, Holland: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1983), esp. Introduction, ix x and p. 312 13; Carolyn Merchant, The Death of Nature: Women, Ecology, and the Scientific Revolution (New York: Harper & Row, 1980). See also Mary Midgley, The Ethical Primate: Humans, Freedom, and Morality (New York: Routledge, 1994), 193 pp, esp. Chs. 7, 8. Helen E. Longino and Ruth Doell, ‘Body, Bias, and Behaviour: A Comparative Analysis of Reasoning in Two Areas of Biological Science,’ in Feminism & Science, ed. Evelyn Fox Keller and Helen E. Longino (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996).

[36] Margaret Wertheim, Pythagoras' Trousers: God, Physics, and the Gender Wars (New York: Times Books, 1995), 279 pp; see also Margaret Wertheim, ‘Faith, Physics, and Feminism: The 1995-96 J. K. Russell Fellowship Lecture,’ CTNS Bulletin 16.2 Spring (1996); Margaret Wertheim, ‘God of the Quantum Vacuum,’ New Scientist 150, no. 2102 (4 October 1997): 28-31.

[37] Wertheim, Pythagoras' Trousers, 8-9, 15; see also David F. Noble, A World Without Women: The Christian Clerical Culture of Western Science (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), Introduction.

[38] Robert John Russell, ‘The Relevance of Tillich for the Theology / Science Dialogue,’ in Paul Tillich Annual Meeting Conference Proceedings, ed. Paul Carr (North American Tillich Society, 1999); Robert John Russell, ‘Eschatology and Physical Cosmology: A Preliminary Reflection,’ in The Far Future: Eschatology from a Cosmic Perspective, ed. George F. R. Ellis (Philadelphia: Templeton Foundation Press, 2002); Robert John Russell, ‘Bodily Resurrection, Eschatology and Scientific Cosmology: The Mutual Interaction of Christian Theology and Science,’ in Resurrection: Theological and Scientific Assessments, ed. Ted Peters, Robert John Russell and Michael Welker (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2002); Robert John Russell, Time in Eternity, (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press 2012).

[39] The relevant graphics are to be found in Ted Peters, Robert John Russell and Michael Welker (eds.), Resurrection. Theological and Scientific Assessments (Grand Rapids, Michigan / Cambridge, UK: Eerdmans 2012), 12.

[40] Robert John Russell, ‘Whitehead, Einstein and the Newtonian Legacy,’ in Newton and the New Direction in Science, ed. S. J. G. V. Coyne, M. Heller (Citta del Vaticano: Specola Vaticana, 1988); see also, for example, Robert John Russell, ‘A Critical Appraisal of Peacocke’s Thought on Religion and Science,’ Religion & Intellectual Life [New Rochelle] II no. 4 (1985) (College of New Rochelle).

[41] Drees, Religion, Science and Naturalism, 143.

[42] Peacocke, Theology for a Scientific Age, 12. See Leplin, Scientific Realism.

[43] Bloor, Knowledge and Social Imagery. See Peacocke, Intimations of Reality,  19‑22 for helpful references and counterarguments.

[44] Mikael Stenmark, Rationality in Science, Religion, and Everyday Life: A Critical Evaluation of Four Models of Rationality (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1995), 392 pp.

[45] Wesley Wildman, ‘Similarities and Differences in the Practice of Science and Theology,’ CTNS Bulletin 14.4 (Fall 1994): 1‑14.

[46] Nancey Murphy, ‘Religion, Theology, and the Philosophy of Science: An Appreciation of the Work of Ian Barbour,” in Fifty Years in Science and Religion: Ian G. Barbour and his Legacy, Robert John Russell, ed. (Ashgate: 2004), p. 97-107, esp. p. 98.

[47] Andreas Losch, Jenseits der Konflikte. Eine konstruktiv-kritische Auseinandersetzung von Theologie und Naturwissenschaft (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht 2011).

[48] Clayton, Explanation.

[49] Nancey Murphy, Beyond Liberalism and Fundamentalism: How Modern and Postmodern Philosophy Set the Theological Agenda (Valley Forge, Pa.: Trinity Press International, 1996), 162 pp.

[50] Barbour, Religion and Science; Charles and John B. Cobb Birch, Jr., The Liberation of Life (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981); John F. Haught, Science & Religion: From Conflict to Conversion (New York: Paulist Press, 1995); David Ray Griffin, ed., The Reenchantment of Science: Postmodern Proposals, SUNY Series in Constructive Postmodern Thought (Albany, N.Y.: State University of New York Press, 1988), 173 pp.

[51] Polkinghorne, The Faith of a Physicist.

[52] Drees, Religion, Science and Naturalism.


Picture credits
Ian Barbour (c) CTNS/Carleton College
First edition of the Issues in Science and Religion (1966) (c) Wikimedia Commons
Golden Gate Bridge (c) Wikimedia Commons
Arthur Peacocke (c) Forum Grenzfragen/Counterbalance Foundation
Imre Lakatos (c) Wikimedia Commons
Robert John Russell with Ian Barbour (c) CTNS